Mockingjay Slips By EDR Tools With Process Injection Technique

Mockingjay Slips By EDR Tools With Process Injection Technique

Endpoint detection and response (EDR) systems have become increasingly efficient at detecting typical process injection attempts that invoke a combination of application programming interfaces to insert code into the memory space of a running process.

So researchers at Israeli-based Security Joes set out to find another way to due process injection without relying on EDR-monitored APIs. The result is Mockingjay, a novel method for process injection that leverages dynamic link libraries (DLLs) with default read, write, and execute (RWX) permissions to push code into the address space of a running process.

The Mockingjay Approach

The approach reduces the likelihood of an endpoint security mechanism detecting a malicious process injection effort and requires a smaller number of steps to achieve, Security Joes said in a report this week. “Our research aimed to discover alternative methods to dynamically execute code within the memory space of Windows processes, without relying on the monitored Windows APIs,” the security firm said.

“Our unique approach, which involves leveraging a vulnerable DLL and copying code to the appropriate section, allowed us to inject code without memory allocation, permission setting, or even starting a thread in the targeted process.”

Process injection is a technique for manipulating the memory of a process to either add new functionality or modify its behavior. Attackers commonly use the method to hide malicious code and evade detection on compromised systems. Common process injection methods include self-injection where a process that receives the injected payload also executes it; DLL injection where a malicious DLL is loaded into the memory space of a process; and PE injection where a portable executable file is mapped into the memory of a running process.

“Each of these injection techniques requires a set of specific Windows APIs, which generate characteristic patterns that can be leveraged by defenders and security software for detection and mitigation purposes,” Security Joes said in its report. For instance, the APIs required for self-injection are VirtualAlloc, LocalAlloc, GlobalAlloc, and Virtual Protect, the company said. Similarly, the APIs used in PE injection are VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, and CreateRemoteThread. Most EDR systems are tuned to monitor commonly used APIs in process injection attacks and can effectively identify malicious activity associated with their use.

Abusing Vulnerable DLLs

The strategy Security Joes used in developing Mockingjay was to systematically search for DLLs within the Windows OS that contained a default RWX section. Researchers at the company developed a tool that explored the entire Windows file system to identify DLLs that could serve as potential vehicles for code injection without triggering an EDR alert. The exploration resulted in Security Joes finding a DLL (msys-2.0.dll) with 16KB of RWX space in Visual Studio 2022 Community that they could use for injecting and executing their own code.

“After identifying the vulnerable DLL that contains a default Read-Write-Execute (RWX) section on disk, we conducted several tests to explore two different methods that could leverage this misconfiguration to execute code in memory,” Security Joes said.

One method was to directly load the vulnerable DLL into the memory space of a custom application called nightmare.exe that Security Joes developed. Doing that allowed researchers to inject and execute their own shellcode into the memory space of the application without leveraging any Windows APIs. Among other things, the shellcode also removed all EDR hooks without triggering any alerts. “This complete removal of dependency on Windows APIs not only reduces the likelihood of detection but also enhances the effectiveness of the technique,” the company said.

Security Joes’ second tactic for abusing the RWX section in the DLL was to do process injection in a remote process. To achieve this, they first identified binaries that used mysys-2.0.dll for their operations. Many of these were associated with GNU utilities and other applications that require POSIX emulation. For the proof-of-concept, researchers chose the ssh.exe process in Visual Studio 2022 Community as the target for injecting their code. “It is important to note that in this injection method, there is no need to explicitly create a thread within the target process, as the process automatically executes the injected code,” the company explained.

According to Security Joes, the DLL that its researchers used to developed Mockingjay is just one of potentially many others that can similarly be abused for code injection purposes. Addressing the threat requires endpoint security tools that don’t just monitor specific APIs and DLLs but also use behavioral analysis and machine learning techniques to identify process injection.